A Farm Level Analysis of the Economic Impact of the MARENA Program in Honduras by Bravo-Ureta, Boris E. et al.
    1 
A Farm Level Analysis of the Economic Impact of the MARENA Program in Honduras  
 
Authors: 
Boris E. Bravo-Ureta 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of Connecticut, Storrs. 
Email: boris.bravoureta@uconn.edu 
 
Alexandre de Almeida 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 




RSMAS, University of Miami, and 
CESTA, Florida A&M University 
Email: d.solis@miami.edu 
 
 Aarón Inestroza  






Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Southern Agricultural Economics Association 







Copyright 2010 by Bravo-Ureta, de Almeida, Solís and Inestroza.  All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.     2 




1*, Alexandre de Almeida
1,  Daniel Solís







This study examines the  impact of the MARENA Program on farm income, 
where the latter is measured as the total value of farm output (TVFO).  MARENA 
is a natural resource management program which was implemented in Honduras 
between 2002 and 2009.  The impact of MARENA on TVFO is measured using a 
2-period panel data set collected early in the life of the Program (2004) and then 
again towards the end of its implementation (2008).  The methodology relies on 
Propensity Score Matching and the estimation of a fixed effects income model.  
The Box-Cox transformation rejects the null hypothesis that the income model is 
log linear in favor of the linear specification.  The data set  includes 109 
beneficiaries and 262 non-beneficiaries or control farmers.  The control group is 
divided into those located within MARENA’s area of influence (neighbors) and 
those located outside the area of influence (non-neighbors). To evaluate the 
sensitivity of the results, the matching is done for two different subgroups using 
the ‘1-to-1’ closest neighbor criterion.  The econometric estimates suggest that 
MARENA has had a positive and significant effect on TVFO, with an average 
annual increase on the TVFO of beneficiaries of US $296 and US $245 relative to 
the control depending on the matched sample used. The analysis suggests that 
MARENA has not  had a  ‘contagion’  or  ‘spillover effect’.  Various expected 
internal rates of return (IRR) figures are calculated under different scenarios and 
the results indicate that the 12% required IRR can be achieved  uniformly.  
Finally,  the fixed effects coefficients are used to calculate (time invariant) 
Technical Efficiency (TE) scores for the various matched subgroups.  On average, 
beneficiaries exhibit significantly higher TE levels compared to the control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many developing countries around the world severely underfund their National 
Agricultural Research Systems and  their publicly provided extension services  (World  Bank, 
2008).  This behavior is at odds with the need many of these countries have to improve their 
competitiveness if they are to become active participants  in  and benefit from the growing 
globalization of the economy.  Moreover, there is ample research that reveals high rates of return 
for public investment in both agricultural  research  and extension in developing as well as 
developed countries (Alston, et al., 2000).  In addition, a large number of empirical studies 
suggest that considerable gains could be achieved by farm level improvements in efficiency but 
this would require a sustained support for extension services (Bravo-Ureta et al, 2007; Battese, 
1992).  
In Central America, the lack of public support for agricultural research and extension 
should be seen in the context of significant poverty, as well as a rapidly deteriorating resource 
base.  In this environment, poor farmers try to eke a leaving by cultivating  steep slopes,  a 
practice  that  is associated with deforestation, soil erosion,  and  declining water quantity and 
quality, among other severe problems, all of which feeds back to lower farm productivity and 
worsening poverty rates (Pelupessy and Ruben, 2000).    Recognizing these major challenges, the 
international community has come around to the old idea, proposed by Johnston and Mellor 
(1961),  that agricultural productivity growth is an essential component of any development 
strategy (World Bank, 2008).  Within this strategy, there is increasing pressure on multilateral 
and  bilateral organizations as well as private foundations to provide more assistance  to 
developing country agriculture particularly as we witness growing challenges in meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2008).  At the same time,  there is a rising need for     4 
documenting the impact of international assistance in achieving the millennium agenda set by 
donors and developing country governments (World Bank, 2006).   
This paper focuses on Honduras where rural poverty and environmental degradation are 
severe problems (IMF, 2004).  Over the past decade, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), among other organizations, has provided a significant number of loans to the Honduran 
Government to fund programs designed to decrease poverty while alleviating the pressure on the 
environment (IDB, 2004). One such initiative is the MARENA program which is the focus of 
this paper. 
The main goal of  MARENA  was  to promote sustainable rural development by 
strengthening  natural resource management,  at both local and regional levels, in an  area of 
influence covering 13,721 Km
2 and close to 930,000 inhabitants. The program sought to reduce 
poverty and the physical, economic and environmental vulnerability in critical areas in order to 
improve the quality of life of the benefitted communities.  MARENA was based on a concept of 
territorial management including  three  river  basins and  11  sub-basins  where participatory 
processes defined the priorities and plans of action.  The Program was organized into three 
components  and several modules.  Module 3 within Component  II  focused on promoting 
investments in sustainable production systems with a budget of US $7.6 million for this purpose 
(Bravo-Ureta, 2009).  The major activities undertaken with beneficiaries  include training in 
various aspects of business management and sustainable farming practices, and the provision of 
funds to co-finance investment activities through local rural savings associations. 
Despite the effort and financial resources invested to promote rural and environmental 
programs in Central America little work has been done to examine the impact of such initiatives. 
The lack of research on this field is likely due to cost considerations and lack of adequate data     5 
collection efforts by project implementers.  MARENA is an exception on this regard, since the 
collection of farm-level data to monitor and evaluate the program was a priority from the 
beginning.  
The objective of this paper is to conduct an evaluation of the impact of Module 3 in 
Component II of MARENA on farm level beneficiaries. To reach this goal we first obtained a 
comparable data set including beneficiaries and a control group using Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) techniques.  To evaluate the indirect impact of MARENA on non-beneficiary farms living 
within the area of influence of the project, the data also includes farms located outside of this 
area. Then, we compare the difference between the value  of agricultural production of the 
studied groups using fixed effects models.  In addition, we examine the internal rate of return of 
the Program under different scenarios and we evaluate the differences in technical efficiency 
among the project’s beneficiaries and the control groups.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the 
literature followed by a description of the data and methodology. We then discuss the key results 
and end with concluding remarks. 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
Bresciani and Valdés (2007) argue that improving the income of rural households is an 
essential strategy to reduce poverty in less favorable areas due to close linkages with the labor 
and food markets, and a high multiplier effect on other sectors of the economy. Furthermore, 
Vosti and Reardon (1997) claim that to reach an adequate level of economic development in 
peasant economies it is necessary to address the ‘critical triangle’ of economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, and environmental sustainability. Consistent with this view, alternative strategies 
have been implemented by governments, international donors and multilateral banks to improve     6 
the economic well-being in the rural areas of developing countries.  Unfortunately, there is a 
limited number of quantitative studies analyzing the factors associated with rural household 
income in Central America. 
Among the few available articles, López and Romano (2000), and López (2000) evaluate, 
respectively, the determinants of household income in Honduras and El Salvador.  Both studies 
use socioeconomic and farm-household characteristics to develop a per capita income model.  
López and Romano (2000) concluded that to improve rural income in the area under study, it is 
necessary to promote the development of the labor and credit markets and  improve human 
capital  by  expanding  extension systems and rural education.  Using a multiple equation 
household income model, Bravo-Ureta et al. (2006) analyzed the effect of participating on two 
natural resource management programs in El Salvador (PAES) and Honduras (CAJON) on the 
income of beneficiaries.  Their results suggest that output diversification, soil conservation 
practices and structures, and the adoption of forestry systems have a positive and statistically 
significant association with farm income.  Also, farmers who own land enjoy higher farm 
incomes than those who do not.   
The  income studies just mentioned provide useful insights but do not focus on the 
evaluation of the impact that can be attributed to the interventions analyzed.  Table 1 shows 
recent studies that have used impact evaluation methods to explicitly quantify the welfare effects 
that can be attributed to various projects conducted in rural communities in several countries. It 
is worth noting that none of these studies focuses on Central America. 
Sadoulet et al. (2001) evaluated the impact of the PROCAMPO program in Mexico on 
rural household income.    The aim of this program was  to compensate farmers, using cash 
transfers, for potential lower commodity prices stemming from the incorporation of Mexico to     7 
NAFTA.    Using a difference-in-difference  (DID)  income model, the authors found that 
PROCAMPO had a positive indirect effect on their beneficiaries’ household income.  Sadoulet et 
al. (2001) argue that the cash transfer program helped in reducing credit constraints allowing 
farmers to improve production and productivity and, consequently, their income levels. 
Godtland et al. (2004) analyzed the impact of farmer-field schools (FFS) in Peru and find 
that participating farmers were able to raise their average potato output by 52% in a normal year.  
Feder et al. (2004), using data for rice-growing villages in Indonesia, also examined the impact 
of FFS and found no significant impact of yield growth or reduction in the use of pesticides. The 
authors used DID estimates along with fixed effects to address selection bias arising from time-
invariant unobservable characteristics; however, they did not use any matching techniques to 
ensure that the control and treated groups had similar observable characteristics. Along the lines 
of the Feder study, Praneetvatakul and Waibel (2006) evaluated the impact of FFS in Thailand 
between 2000 and 2003 and found that pesticide expenditures were reduced by the extension 
intervention. 
Skoufias (2005) studied the effect of PROGRESA on the well-being of rural families in 
areas of extreme poverty in Mexico.  The impact of the project was measured using a statistical 
analysis which included farmers associated with the program as well as a control group.  The 
results show that in a two year period PROGRESA decreased poverty by 17% in its area of 
influence with respect to the control area. 
Rodríguez et al. (2007) evaluated a rural development project aiming to improve income 
among coconut producers in the Philippines. These authors implemented a DID income model 
which included farmers associated with the project and a control group using a balanced panel 
data set for a two-year period.  The authors show that the implementation of this project had     8 
positive and significant effects on poverty reduction among beneficiaries.  They also conclude 
that one of the most important restrictions facing small scale farmers in the area under study was 
credit availability. 
More recently, other studies that use matching techniques and DID methods to analyze 
interventions in several developing countries include the work of Nakasone (2008) for Peru on 
land Titling programs, Dillon (2008) for irrigation in Mali et al. (2008) for livestock in Uruguay, 
Cerdán-Infantes et al. (2008) for grapes in Argentina, and Essama-Nssah et al. (2008) for tea 
farming in Rwanda (Table 1). 
The present study contributes to the limited literature focusing on the impact evaluation 
of  natural  resource management projects by examining the impact of MARENA on its 
beneficiaries.  We make an effort to capture possible spillover effects on non-beneficiaries living 
within the Program’s area of influence and we also make use of the fixed effects estimates to 
calculate average technical efficiency levels for the different groups under study.  Available data 
on the cost of implementing the Program along with the benefits estimated from our econometric 
work are used to compute expected internal rates of return under alternative scenarios.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA  
The impact of MARENA is measured by the difference in the total value of farm output 
(TVFO)  between individuals who participated in the MARENA program (treated), and the 
incomes of individuals who did not (control).   This difference is known as the treatment effect.  
Formally, consider a farmer i in time period t and let the dummy variable Di = 1 if the farmer 
received the treatment, and Di = 0 if the farmer did not, and Yi is the potential outcome. is  Then, 
the average treatment effect (ATE), conditional on Xi is given by:       9 
] 0 , [ ] 1 , [ = = − = = i i D   D   x X Y E x X Y E i i i i .                                                                       (1) 
 Clearly, both outcomes cannot be observed at the same time for the i
th individual, which 
constitutes  one  of  the main analytical problems in impact evaluation (Ravallion, 2008). 
Therefore, to implement this model, it is necessary to find a group of farmers not associated with 
the project  (control group)  that resembles beneficiary farmers as much as possible prior to 
project implementation (i.e., baseline).  The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method is often 
used to generate such control group.  PSM yields a ‘score’ equal to the probability of receiving 
treatment, considering  both treated and non-treated groups, given a set of predetermined 
covariates.  The PSM approach used here requires first the implementation of a Logit model to 
estimate the probability that a farmer in the sample will become associated with the project 
(participation model). Then, every beneficiary is matched with a farmer in the control group and 
such matching can be done using various alternative procedures (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
PSM does not completely eliminate biases that might stem from observable characteristics across 
the treatment and control groups but, according to Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) among other 
authors, it provides a good approximation.  In this paper, matching is done using the ‘1-to-1 
nearest neighbor’ criterion (Sianesi, 2001). 
Once the control group is selected, the impact of the project on the TVFO of its 
beneficiaries can be estimated using a DID estimator assuming that panel data  is available 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2005), as is the case in the present study.  In general terms, the DID 
approach compares the difference between the income of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries at 
the baseline versus the difference in income at a point typically close to the end of the 
implementation of the project.       10 
In  estimating  the  treatment  effect, another source of bias can arise stemming  from 
unobserved characteristics (e.g., managerial skills) which can be controlled using a fixed effects 
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where Yit is TVFO, Bit is a dummy that measures the treatment effect, Nit is a dummy if the 
farmer is not a beneficiary of MARENA but lives within its area of influence, Tt is a dummy 
variable equal to 0 for the baseline, Xit is a vector of observed control variables, Fi is the farm 
fixed effects, εit is an error term and the greek characters are parameters to be estimated (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009).  In this study, the control group is composed of two subgroups, Neighbors 
and Non-Neighbors, in an attempt to capture spill over or contagion effects, as explained below.     
To estimate the  model  in equation (2) we  have  a panel data set that includes 109 
MARENA beneficiaries and a control group comprised of 262 households in each of two time 
periods.  The control group includes 145 households living inside the area of influence of the 
Program  and 117  located outside this area. The data were  collected during the  2003-04 
agricultural year (baseline) and then four years later for the 2007-08 production cycle.  The data 
include information on socioeconomic characteristics of the household as well as alternative 
sources of income, quantity of inputs and outputs, costs and revenues.  Table 2 defines all the 
variables included in both the participation (Logit) and income models.  
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RESULTS 
Selection of the Matched Groups 
As indicated, PSM was used to match beneficiaries with a control group.  In doing so, we 
first fitted a Logit model to estimate the probability of being a MARENA beneficiary for each 
household in the baseline sample.  Thus, the dichotomous dependent variable equal to 1 if the 
household is a beneficiary  and 0 otherwise.  The estimated Logit equation can be written in 
general terms as: 
 
BENEF = f (AGLAND, CAFEECO, NUMBER, ALTITUD, AGE, EDUC, ORGA, ASSIST, 
DIVER)                                          (3) 
 
All variables are defined in Table 2 and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.    
The matching was first done using all available data to estimate the Logit model  based 
on the ‘1-to-1 nearest neighbor without replacement’ criterion (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).  Then 
the model was re-estimated using only the Non-Neighbor subgroup.  The results of the Logit 
models, shown in Table 4, are consistent across the two samples used. Specifically, the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously zero is rejected consistently at the 1% 
significance level. In addition, the percentages of correctly predicted responses are high (higher 
thah77%).  In general, households participating in a farmer organization, receiving technical 
assistance, producing a diversified cropping plan and using ecological practices are more likely 
to be beneficiaries of MARENA.  Conversely, famers cultivating larger farms are less likely to 
be beneficiaries.     12 
The matched subsamples from both Logit models are determined for those propensity 
scores that fall within the common support area
4
A  t-test  was conducted  before and after matching for the baseline data to determine 
whether the means  of  observed characteristics of the beneficiary households are statistically 
different from the non-beneficiaries.  For the matched groups, the results of the t-tests show that 
most of the observed characteristics are not statistically different  which means that the 
independent variables satisfy the balancing property (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).  
 (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).  This procedure 
yields a total of 100 pairs, 56 neighbors and 44 Non-Neighbors, when the total sample is used for 
the matching (N=400), and 102 pairs when only the Non-Neighbors are used (N=408).   Table 5 
presents descriptive statistics for each group.   
 
Impact of MARENA on its Beneficiaries  
The Unmatched Total Sample (UTS) along with the two matched data sets - Matched 
Total  Sample  (MTS)  and  Non-Neighbors  Only  (MNN)-  are  used to estimate the following 
equation using the fixed effects framework:  
 
TVFO = f (BENEF, NEIGHBOR, YEAR, TLAND, EXPEND, LABOR, ORGA, TITLE)                                                                                 
(4) 
 
where all variables are as defined in Table 2.  
The  estimates for the  three TVFO equations using  the  UTS,  MTS and MNN data 
configurations are presented in Table 7. The F statistic in all three cases is significant at the 1%; 
thus, the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are equal to zero is rejected.  The Box-Cox 
transformation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) is used to test the Cobb-Douglas versus the linear 
                                                           
4 The common support area represents the intersection of propensity score ranges for the treatment and control 
groups.     13 
specifications and  the latter is favored in all three  cases.    We should note  that  the linear 
functional form has been used by other authors including Rodriguez et al. (2007) and Saudolet et 
al. (2001) in their impact evaluation studies.  Both the UTS and MTS equations present four 
statistically significant slope parameters (10% or better) while the MMN has only two significant 
parameters. The corrected R
2 for the UTS regression is 0.54, compared to 0.74 and 0.76 for the 
MTS and MNN cases, respectively. 
The  parameters of particular interest are those associated with the dummy variables 
BENEF and NEIGHBOR.  The parameter for BENEF is positive and statistically significant in 
the three equations in Table 7.  The value of this parameter is lowest  (14,988) for the UTS 
model, and the value for the other two models are relatively close, 22,825 for the MTS and 
18,874 for the MNN regressions.  The variable NEIGHBOR appears in two of the three models 
and its parameter is not statistically significant suggesting that contagion effect is not present. 
The 22,825 parameter value for BENEF in the MTS model suggests that the total impact 
of MARENA on TVFO over the four years encompassed  by the data,  with respect to the 
combined control group (Neighbors and Non-Neighbors) amounts to US $1,183 or a simple 
annual average equal to US $296 per household at an exchange rate of HNL $19.3 per US 
Dollar.  If we now focus on the MNN model, the parameter for BENEF suggests a simple 
average annual MARENA effect equal to US $245.  It is instructive to note that these numbers 
are quite similar and we would expect the true impact to be somewhere within these fairly 
narrow  bounds.  Thus we use these  computed  average  effects on beneficiaries  to calculate 
alternative internal rates of return for MARENA.      
Table 8 presents four scenarios of expected rates of return for the component of the 
MARENA Program evaluated in this paper.  Scenarios 1 and 3 show an Internal Rate of Return     14 
(IRR) equal to 41% and 27% resulting from an impact on beneficiaries for the MTS and MNN 
groups, respectively.   Scenario 2 indicates that to get an IRR of 12% only 8,600 beneficiary 
families are needed per year from 2007 to 2009 for the MTS.  The corresponding number of 
families for the MNN sample is 10,800 (Scenario 4).   
Finally, we are interested on the level of technical efficiency (TE), which is a proxy for 
managerial ability (Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta, 1995), for the various subgroups in our sample.  
For this purpose, we use the fixed effects coefficients to calculate (time invariant) TE scores for 
each farm (Coelli et al, 2005).
5
An important area of future work is to elucidate the TE levels for each relevant group at 
the baseline compared to the endline and to test whether the intervention has an impact on TE, 
i.e., on managerial performance.  In principle, this is similar to the decomposition of productivity 
growth into technological change, which in this context would be a jump in the TVFO function 
(frontier) from the first to the second period, and into TE which reflects  how close farmers are to 
the relevant TVFO function (frontier) in each time period.  Some methodological progress has 
  As shown in Table 9, the TE for beneficiaries is consistently 
higher than for the control farmers.   Specifically, for the Total Unmatched Sample, the average 
TE for beneficiaries is 66.5% while that for Neighbors and Non-Neighbors is 61.8% and 62.5%, 
respectively.  The average TE from the Total Matched Sample is 47.2% for beneficiaries, 43.3% 
for Neighbors and 43.7% for Non-Neighbors.  The figures for the MNN grouping are 68.1% for 
beneficiaries and 63.8% for Non-Neighbors.  The statistical significance of the difference 
between relevant pairs of average TE scores is given at the bottom of Table 9.   
                                                           
5 Technical efficiency is calculated from the fixed effects parameters as TEi = αi / maxi{αi} given the linear function 
form used (Coelli et al, 2005, p. 276), where αi is the  coefficient of the i
th farm dummy variable in eq. 2.  
Around 96% of the fixed effect parameters are significant at the 1% level.  
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been done along these lines (Kumbhakar et al., 2009; Bravo-Ureta et al., 2009) but additional 
efforts are needed in order to formulate a full decomposition.    
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This study uses the Propensity Score Matching  technique along with a fixed effects 
estimator to examine the impact of a major agricultural and environmental development 
component of the MARENA Program on the farm income of its beneficiaries. These methods 
reduce  potential  biases  stemming from differences in observed factors between treated and 
control groups as well as from unobserved characteristics such as managerial skills.  
Very similar results are obtained from  two alternatively matched  subgroups  which 
suggest that MARENA has indeed contributed significantly to the well-being of beneficiaries. 
Specifically, over four years of implementation, the contribution of MARENA to the average 
annual value of farm output per beneficiary ranges from US $296 to US $245, depending on the 
matched subsamples used, relative to the control group that lives outside the area of influence.  
Furthermore,  the results suggest that MARENA has not had  an impact on non-beneficiaries 
living within its area of influence (contagion effect).  To our knowledge, this type of contagion 
effect, although discussed in the literature, has not been well documented and is a subject that 
warrants further attention.  An implication of contagion would be that beneficiaries, particularly 
those that are leaders within their villages, could be included in farm extension efforts directed to 
their communities.  This would be a cost effective way to reach non-beneficiaries to enhance 
spillover effects, and thus expand upon the work done by extensionists that are typically hired in 
projects to provide technical assistance.           16 
Although our results reveal rates of return in excess of the typical 12% cut-off rate, the 
data available does not make it possible to infer whether the stream of benefits extends beyond 
the life of the project which is an important consideration when time comes to judge the 
sustainability of these types of investments.  This is clearly another area that requires additional 
work.       17 
 
Table 1.   Recent Papers Analyzing Project Interventions in Developing Countries. 
  Study  
Country  Intervention/Project: Indicator  Panel  (First Author, Year) 
Cerdán-Infantes, 2008  Argentina   Extension: Grape, Yield and Quality  Yes 
       
Lopez, 2008  Uruguay  
Livestock: Management, Productivity and 
Specialization   Yes 
       
Essama-Nssah, 2008  Rwanda   Privatization Program: Tea Sector  No 
       
Dillon, 2008  Mali   Irrigation: Value of Agricultural Production   Yes 
       
Nakasone, 2008  Peru   Land Titling Program and Labor Allocation  Yes 
       
Rodriguez, 2007  Philippines  
Agricultural Development: Coconut 
Producers  Yes 
       
Praneetvataku, 2006  Thailand  
Farmer Field Schools: Rice Yields and 
Pesticide Use  Yes 
       
Skoufias, 2005  Mexico  
PROGRESA: Welfare Impact of Rural 
Households  Yes 
       
Feder, 2004  Indonesia  
Farmer Field Schools: Rice Yields and 
Pesticide Use  Yes 
       
Godtland, 2004  Peru   Farmer Field Schools: Potato Farmers  No 
       
Saudolet, 2001  Mexico  
PROCAMPO: Cash transfer for 
Agricultural Production  Yes 
               18 
     Table 2.  Definition of Variables. 
Variable  Unit  Definition 
TVFO  HNL*  Total value of  farm output 
BENEF  Dummy  1 if the household is a beneficiary of MARENA  
NEIGHBOR  Dummy  1 if the household  is not a beneficiary of MARENA  and lives 
within its area of influence 
NNEIGH  Dummy  1 if the household  is not a beneficiary of MARENA and  lives 
outside its area of influence (excluded category) 
EXPEND  HNL  Total expenditures on purchased farm inputs 
LABOR  HNL  Total value of family labor plus hired labor expenses 
TLAND  Hectares  Total farm land  
AGLAND  Hectares  Total land devoted to agricultural production 
DIVER  Dummy  1 if household produces crops in addition to maize and beans 
CAFEECO  Dummy  1 if the household produces coffee using ecological practices 
ALTITUD  Dummy  1 if the farm  is located at an altitude higher than the mean 
AGE  Years  Age of household head 
EDUC  Years  Years of schooling  of the household head 
NUMBER  Number  Number of people in the household 
ORGA  Dummy  1 if the household head  participates in farmer organizations 
TITLE  Dummy  1 if the household has legal title to at least some of the land farmed 
ASSIST   Dummy  1 if the household receives technical assistance 
YEAR  Dummy  0 = 2004, 1 = 2008 
* HNL stands for Honduran Lempiras where US$ 1 = HNL 19.3  
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Mean  SD 
Beneficiaries (N=109)   
AGLAND  1.80  0.12 
CAFEECO  0.02  0.01 
NUMBER  6.20  0.26 
ALTITUD  0.46  0.05 
EDUC  3.50  0.26 
AGE  46.61  1.38 
ORGA  0.73  0.04 
ASSIST  0.44  0.05 
DIVER  0.52  0.05 
Control Neighbor (N=145) 
AGLAND  2.62  0.51 
CAFEECO  -  - 
NUMBER  5.93  0.21 
ALTITUD  0.55  0.04 
EDUC  3.59  0.27 
AGE  45.81  1.10 
ORGA  0.24  0.04 
ASSIST  0.26  0.04 
DIVER  0.46  0.04 
Control Non-Neighbor (N=117)   
AGLAND  3.22  0.52 
CAFEECO  0.01  0.01 
NUMBER  6.01  0.24 
ALTITUD  0.49  0.05 
EDUC  3.04  0.27 
AGE  50.96  1.34 
ORGA  0.26  0.05 
ASSIST  0.21  0.04 
DIVER  0.42  0.05 
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AGLAND    -0.374***  -0.425*** 
    (0.099)  (0.122) 
CAFEECO    4.008**  3.621* 
    (1.976)  (2.264) 
NUMBER    0.042  0.033 
    (0.053)  (0.064) 
ALTITUD    -0.468*  -0.426 
    (0.279)  (0.340) 
AGE    -0.011  -0.020* 
    (0.010)  (0.012) 
EDUC    -0.035  0.006 
    (0.050)  (0.066) 
ORGA    2.282***  2.269*** 
    (0.288)  (0.346) 
ASSIST    0.655**  0.877** 
    (0.287)  (0.3653) 
DIVER    0.499*  0.592* 
    (0.290)  (0.364) 
CONSTANT    -1.278**  0.050 
    (0.605)  (0.844) 
Likelihood Ratio Test (χ
2 [8 df])  108.93***  86.89*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.24  0.27 
N  371  226 
Predicted Correctly (%)   78.98  77.43 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01     21 
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics before and after the Implementation of MARENA for the 
Matched Total Sample (MTS).  
   2004     2008 
Variable  Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Beneficiaries (N=100)         
TVFO   26,274.98    31,398.79      40,363.30    79,597.06  
TLAND           5.32          16.87              5.79          19.74  
EXPEND     9,438.26    11,880.49        7,577.56      9,770.21  
LABOR   38,729.47    24,015.51      39,363.59    23,923.73  
TITLE           0.56            0.50              0.82            0.39  
ORGA           0.73            0.45              0.75            0.44  
DIVER           0.48            0.50              0.68            0.47  
Control Neighbors (N=56)       
TVFO   50,317.36    74,106.69      42,820.62    62,671.60  
TLAND           3.11            4.69              3.87            6.12  
EXPEND   15,761.07    43,223.22        9,997.14    18,227.51  
LABOR   38,169.82    21,413.39      42,644.60    25,022.95  
TITLE           0.68            0.47              0.86            0.35  
ORGA           0.57            0.50              0.39            0.49  
DIVER           0.46            0.50              0.77            0.43  
Control Non-Neighbors (N=44)         
TVFO   57,019.26    80,131.38      51,111.36    70,050.13  
TLAND         10.27          24.31            10.16          29.28  
EXPEND   14,171.18    30,998.59      16,358.87    35,749.84  
LABOR   36,289.32    18,689.32      41,991.05    25,153.84  
TITLE           0.64            0.49              0.86            0.35  
ORGA           0.61            0.49              0.39            0.49  
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics before and after the Implementation of MARENA for 
Beneficiaries and Control Non-Neighbors (MNN).  
 
Variable 
2004     2008 
Mean  SD     Mean  SD 
Beneficiaries (N=102)             
TVFO   28,028.77    36,025.42      43,825.92    86,906.63  
TLAND           5.72          17.27              6.10          19.87  
EXPEND   11,128.59    17,003.97        7,738.72      9,929.97  
LABOR   39,512.94    24,447.16      41,784.94    33,431.67  
TITLE           0.56            0.50              0.82            0.38  
ORGA           0.74            0.44              0.75            0.43  
DIVER           0.49            0.50              0.69            0.47  
Control Non-Neighbors (N=102)             
TVFO   47,458.24    78,159.92      43,459.84    65,483.21  
TLAND         11.45          45.79            11.35          42.35  
EXPEND   11,148.11    21,935.79      14,548.08    33,648.24  
LABOR   36,868.97    22,311.44      39,744.27    24,837.95  
TITLE           0.59            0.49              0.85            0.36  
ORGA           0.28            0.45              0.25            0.44  
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Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
BENEF  14,988*  22,825*  18,874** 
  (9,079)  (12,683)  (9646.37) 
 
NEIGHBOR  1,779  -266.06   
  (8,494)  (13,953.89)   
 
YEAR  -528.85  -11,114.63  -7,060.607 
  (6,546)  (10,773.79)  (7198.55) 
 
TLAND  454 **  2,119.44**  420.10 
  (207)  (976.58)  (724.89) 
 
EXPEND  0.232 ***  0.2651**  -0.17777 
  (0.084)  (0.15103)  (0.18454) 
 
LABOR  0.424 ***  0.43878**  0.5439*** 
  (0.133)  (0.2134)  (0.1759) 
 
ORGA  3,260  -3,966.16  -3,265.73 
  (6,829)  (8853.79)  (9,024.41) 
 
TITLE  175  6,436.38  7,739.29 
  (6,382)  (8,709.919)  (8,830.04) 
 
CONSTANT  16,359 **  6,253.67  12,569.35 
  (7,492)  (12,200.84)  (11,294.25) 
F  4.3***  2.32**  2.53** 
Box-Cox Test H0: Ө=0  57.9***  11.71***  15.81*** 
R
2  0.54  0.74  0.76 
N  742  400  408     24 
Table 8.  Analysis of MARENA’S Expected Internal Rate of Return.  





Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Inflow  Net flow  NPV  No. of Benef.  Inflow  Net flow  NPV 
2003  -       675,736                   -       (675,736)            (675,736)   -                     -        (675,736)           (675,736) 
2004        205        361,253          60,475       (300,778)            (268,552)                205            60,475        (300,778)           (268,552) 
2005        825        750,156         243,375       (506,781)            (404,003)                825           243,375        (506,781)           (404,003) 
2006     3,228      1,079,109         952,260       (126,849)             (90,289)              3,228           952,260        (126,849)             (90,289) 
2007    13,686      3,163,173      4,037,370         874,197              555,568               8,600        2,537,000        (626,173)           (397,945) 
2008    13,686      1,597,192      4,037,370      2,440,178            1,384,622               8,600        2,537,000          939,808              533,272  
2009    13,686                  -      4,037,370      4,037,370            2,045,457               8,600        2,537,000       2,537,000           1,285,323  
Total        7,626,620    13,368,220      5,741,600                        0           8,867,110       1,240,490              (17,928) 
TIR              41%           12% 
Total Value of Farm Output (TVFO)/Year - Beneficiaries =  $295              
Matched with Beneficiaries and Control Non-Neighbors (MNN) 
Year 
No. of  
Benef. 
Outflow 
Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Inflow  Net flow  NPV  No. of Benef.  Inflow  Net flow  NPV 
2003   -        675,736                   -       (675,736)            (675,736)   -                     -        (675,736)           (675,736) 
2004        205        361,253          50,020       (311,233)            (277,887)                205            50,020        (311,233)           (277,887) 
2005        825        750,156         201,300       (548,856)            (437,545)                825           201,300        (548,856)           (437,545) 
2006     3,228      1,079,109         787,632       (291,477)            (207,468)              3,228           787,632        (291,477)           (207,468) 
2007    13,686      3,163,173      3,339,384         176,211              111,985             10,800        2,635,200        (527,973)           (335,537) 
2008    13,686      1,597,192      3,339,384      1,742,192              988,566             10,800        2,635,200       1,038,008              588,993  
2009    13,686                -        3,339,384      3,339,384            1,691,836             10,800        2,635,200       2,635,200           1,335,074  
Total          7,626,620    11,057,104      3,430,484                        0           8,944,552       1,317,932              (10,104) 
TIR              27%           12% 
Total Value of Farm Output (TVFO)/Year - Beneficiaries =  $244                 
 
Exchange rate: US $1=Lps. 19.3;  Interest rate =12%    
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(A)  Beneficiaries   66.5%  47.2%  68.1% 
 
(B)  Control Neighbors   61.8%  43.3%   
 
(C) Control Non-Neighbors  62.5%  43.7%  63.8% 
 
Note: For each column, (1) to (3), t-tests were performed for the following null hypothesis of the 
equality of means:  Ho:  mean(A)=mean(B), mean(A)=mean(C) and mean(B)=mean(C).  All null 
hypothesis  were rejected at the 1% level of significance.   The only exception is for  column  (2), 
mean(B)=mean(C). 
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